by David Balashinsky
I recently came across the following essay in xoJane: It Happened to Me: I Was Born Without a Vagina Hole," by Anonymous. In this essay, the author recounts the signal events in her youth related to her having been born apparently with the congenital deformity known as microperforate hymen. As frivolously as the author seems to treat this subject (only one of the maddening and grating aspects of Anonymous's writing is her insistence on using the jarring and vulgar vagina hole throughout her essay; surely vaginal introitus is one the few examples we have of an anatomical term for a part of the genitalia that is infinitely more graceful, more mellifluous and downright more appealing than the layman's vagina hole), it is nonetheless moving to read the author's account, first, of her discovery that she was born with a preternaturally small vaginal introitus and, subsequently, of her eventual efforts to seek a surgical remedy for it. Because she was a minor, Anonymous had to persuade her mother to allow her to have the surgery, a campaign that, evidently, was hard won. Happily, Anonymous prevailed. As she reports with ironical understatement, "Eventually . . . I was granted the rights to my very own vagina hole."
This last clause underscores an important point: every human being is born with the right to ownership and control of her or his own body. It should go without saying that the physical boundaries of one's body - its external limits - are analogous to a political border or a property line. Our bodies declare to the world, "no trespassing." Without the sanctity of being secure in one's own physical person, the individual is denied full personhood. An exception to this principle ought not to be made for our genitalia. As with the rest of our bodies, private parts are private property. They don't belong to the state and they don't belong to one's parents.
But Anonymous's essay illustrates another important point, as well. Namely, that the right of bodily self-ownership goes beyond the right to be left alone. It includes the right to control one's body. It necessarily follows that this includes the right to alter one's body as one sees fit. That is why, from an ethical standpoint, I believe that it would have been wrong to deny this young woman the corrective genital surgery that she sought.
Because we experience self-awareness, our bodies have meaning for us. That is no less true and maybe even more true of our genitalia. Hence, it is not merely the rights to protect and to alter one's genitalia that are fundamental but the right to value and to determine for oneself the significance of one's genitalia that is also fundamental. This, too, is an essential part of personshood. That is why it is especially demeaning when opponents of genital rights dismiss the significance of the prepuce by saying "it's just skin," as though the person whose skin it was (even if it were "just skin") had no valid claim to value it and has no valid claim to resent its involuntary removal or to mourn its loss. To impose one's own judgment on the significance to another person of a part of that other person's body that has been stolen from him is an affront to human dignity. This principle is well illustrated by Anonymous's narrative. Why else would she have written about her experience if her genitalia were not an integral part of her self-concept as a human being with free will? Why did she compile a list of reasons why she needed the surgery? Without knowing all of the specific reasons on that list, it is nonetheless evident from this essay that Anonymous attached a meaning and a value to the structure and configuration of her genitalia. Moreover, that the shape, structure, and function of her genitalia were very important - intrinsic, even - to her ability to live her life as she wanted to live it. And that is why this young woman sought to exercise control over her vagina. It was not merely because of the importance of its structure to its physiological function but because the importance to Anonymous of the structure of her vaginal introitus transcended mere function. Not having the opportunities available only to someone with a fully functional (which is to say, complete) genitalia prevented this young woman from fully experiencing her sexuality. And because one's sexuality is central to one's sense of personhood, to deprive this young woman of the right to control her genitalia through the corrective surgery that she sought would be to deprive her of an essential part of her personhood.
This last clause underscores an important point: every human being is born with the right to ownership and control of her or his own body. It should go without saying that the physical boundaries of one's body - its external limits - are analogous to a political border or a property line. Our bodies declare to the world, "no trespassing." Without the sanctity of being secure in one's own physical person, the individual is denied full personhood. An exception to this principle ought not to be made for our genitalia. As with the rest of our bodies, private parts are private property. They don't belong to the state and they don't belong to one's parents.
But Anonymous's essay illustrates another important point, as well. Namely, that the right of bodily self-ownership goes beyond the right to be left alone. It includes the right to control one's body. It necessarily follows that this includes the right to alter one's body as one sees fit. That is why, from an ethical standpoint, I believe that it would have been wrong to deny this young woman the corrective genital surgery that she sought.
Because we experience self-awareness, our bodies have meaning for us. That is no less true and maybe even more true of our genitalia. Hence, it is not merely the rights to protect and to alter one's genitalia that are fundamental but the right to value and to determine for oneself the significance of one's genitalia that is also fundamental. This, too, is an essential part of personshood. That is why it is especially demeaning when opponents of genital rights dismiss the significance of the prepuce by saying "it's just skin," as though the person whose skin it was (even if it were "just skin") had no valid claim to value it and has no valid claim to resent its involuntary removal or to mourn its loss. To impose one's own judgment on the significance to another person of a part of that other person's body that has been stolen from him is an affront to human dignity. This principle is well illustrated by Anonymous's narrative. Why else would she have written about her experience if her genitalia were not an integral part of her self-concept as a human being with free will? Why did she compile a list of reasons why she needed the surgery? Without knowing all of the specific reasons on that list, it is nonetheless evident from this essay that Anonymous attached a meaning and a value to the structure and configuration of her genitalia. Moreover, that the shape, structure, and function of her genitalia were very important - intrinsic, even - to her ability to live her life as she wanted to live it. And that is why this young woman sought to exercise control over her vagina. It was not merely because of the importance of its structure to its physiological function but because the importance to Anonymous of the structure of her vaginal introitus transcended mere function. Not having the opportunities available only to someone with a fully functional (which is to say, complete) genitalia prevented this young woman from fully experiencing her sexuality. And because one's sexuality is central to one's sense of personhood, to deprive this young woman of the right to control her genitalia through the corrective surgery that she sought would be to deprive her of an essential part of her personhood.
That is why Intactivists fight for the right of boys, girls, and intersex children to determine for themselves what parts of their bodies they get to keep. That is why non-consensual genital surgery is a human-rights violation: not only because it violates the sanctity of one's personal borders, and not only because it deprives the victim of the functional use of the part that has been stolen, but because it deprives him of the right to experience his full sexuality and so deprives him of his right to full personhood.
Revised 18-19 November 2018
