The fundamental difference between the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" positions regarding the morality, legality, safety and availability of abortion is that each side defines "abortion" differently. When the pro-life side refers to abortion, it means the deliberate and actual termination of a pregnancy. In contrast, when the pro-choice side refers to abortion, it means the right of a person to terminate her pregnancy. "Pro-life" refers to an act (abortion) that the pro-life side seeks to prevent whereas "pro-choice" refers to a right (to terminate one's pregnancy) that the pro-choice side seeks to defend, whether that right is exercised or not. That is why the pro-choice position is not "pro-abortion" but "pro-choice." (It is also, though not necessarily, why the pro-life position is not "pro-life" but "anti-choice.") It is possible to oppose abortion in some cases, as I do - for example, for the purpose of sex-selection - while still supporting the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy for what I may consider illegitimate reasons. The fact that I do not agree with a person's reasons for obtaining an abortion does not entitle me or anyone else to deny her her right to obtain an abortion. My reasoning is that the right to terminate one's pregnancy follows from the right of a person to own and control her own body. Because this right is the most important and basic right that human beings have, it must be regarded as absolute and must supersede any and all other competing rights, including the "right to life" that is claimed on behalf of fetuses by those who oppose abortion. It does not matter that I or anyone else may object in certain cases (or even in all cases) to abortion: the right to obtain an abortion is fundamental because the right of bodily self-ownership is fundamental. (The fundamental nature of bodily self-ownership is also why I believe that this right supersedes a parent's "right" to subject a child to non-therapeutic genital-alteration surgery.) My pro-choice position, then, is not "pro-abortion," per se, but "pro-choice," meaning that the choice whether or not to terminate a pregnancy belongs to the woman and to the woman, alone, in whose body the fetus is gestating.
This position necessarily entails, however, supporting not just the right of a woman to choose abortion but her right not to: in other words, the right to carry a fetus to term. This is why I oppose the decision of a court in the United Kingdom compelling a woman to undergo an abortion against her will. I oppose this decision not because I am "pro-life" but because I am pro-choice.
The basic facts of the case (as they have been reported) are these: A young woman with both psychological and intellectual disabilities has become pregnant. It is not clear to me whether this woman has been deemed a "ward of the state" but, as the Times has reported this, she is "under the care of" the UK's "National Health Service trust" and the case was heard by a judge within the "Court of Protection," which "hears cases on issues relating to people who are considered to lack the mental capability to make decisions for themselves." The woman wants to carry the fetus to term while the NHS had petitioned the court for permission to have this young woman's pregnancy terminated. The woman's mother, for her part, has stated her willingness to raise the child. The judge, claiming to be ruling in the best interests of the woman herself, has sided with the NHS and ordered the woman to undergo an abortion.
As I see it, a mental or intellectual disability does not nullify a person's fundamental right to own and control her own body. As in every other abortion case, the essential principle in this one is not whether carrying a fetus to term is necessarily in the best interests of the woman (or of the fetus, for that matter) but, rather, who gets to make the decision as to whether or not the pregnancy is terminated. Even in a case where the woman has been deemed intellectually incapable of making appropriate or even rational decisions, that does not mean that she has no rights over her body at all. The fact that she is at least capable of making her wishes known should oblige the state to respect them. If under certain, extraordinary circumstances, a case can be made that the state need not defer blindly and absolutely to a woman's wishes to raise a child, that does not mean that she is not entitled to the same deference that should be given to any other woman who wants to have a child or, for that matter, to terminate her pregnancy.
Although the judge ostensibly made her decision with the best interests of the woman herself in mind, she seems to have given some weight to the best interests of the potential child, as well. Thus, even though the woman's mother has expressed a desire to raise her daughter's child, the judge did not regard this as a sufficient guarantee of the child's future welfare for the reason that the grandmother may need to leave her daughter and grandchild at home unsupervised at some point. The answer to this objection, however, would simply be for the grandmother to make arrangements for a responsible adult to be present in order to supervise the woman and her child when she (the grandmother) cannot be. If necessary, the state itself, through its social services departments, ought to provide personnel for this purpose if the family cannot.
The rationale of safeguarding the welfare of the potential child raises an important matter. The premise of the judge's decision - as well as the legal basis upon which the judge presumably has a right to substitute her judgement for the woman's - is that the pregnant woman in this case is not capable of exercising appropriate judgement. (The woman reportedly has the mental capacity of child between six and nine years old.) But what potential parent has proved satisfactorily that she or he is capable of doing what is best and is going to do what is best for her or his child before her or his right to have that child is not abridged? I have long believed - and still believe - that every person who wants to bring another human life into the world should, in fact, have to demonstrate a minimum level of competence, integrity and responsibility before being permitted to do so. After all, if a person must obtain a license before cutting my hair or doing my nails, does it make sense that the state should not just set the bar lower but establish no bar at all when a person undertakes to assume responsibility for a human life? The epidemic levels of child abuse and neglect amply demonstrate that the lack of a diagnosis of a psychological or intellectual disability in a parent is no guarantee that the care and nurturing that a child will receive will measure up to even minimal standards. Yet, as things stand now, there are no minimal standards, requirements or licensure before one may become a parent. If the state is not going to establish such standards in every case, why should it in this case?
Typically, it is not until an alarm has been raised that the state will intervene in the welfare of a child. As I have said, I do not support the public policy of waiting until a child has been harmed before the state intervenes to protect that child from further harm. It should be obvious, therefore, that I am not suggesting that the state does not have a legitimate interest in insuring - that it has an obligation, in fact, to insure - the welfare of every child. But that interest must be balanced against the rights and interests of the parent. In a case like this, where a woman's diagnosis justifies the state's treating her differently from all other prospective parents, the principle of proportionality argues for establishing an alternative arrangement and an accommodation (as suggested above) rather than the draconian one of overriding the woman's wishes and compelling her to undergo an abortion against her will. In other words, the state should adopt a course of action that maximizes the welfare of all parties while preserving the widest possible zone of bodily autonomy for the woman.
We should be particularly sensitive to the claims of this woman, impaired though she may be, given the notorious and well-documented history of governmental programs of compulsory sterilizations, of which this case is redolent. No doubt, every eugenecist who has had a hand in sterilizing women has rationalized to him- or herself that preventing these women from reproducing is good not just for society as a whole but for such women themselves. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that this case is merely quantitatively different (an abortion, after all, is not permanent in the way that a hysterectomy is), is it really qualitatively different? At its core, this is a case of the state empowering medical professionals to deny a woman her right to control her reproductive freedom and to exercise her reproductive rights. Every person who values women's reproductive rights and freedoms should regard this decision, therefore, as an affront to these rights and freedoms.
Paradoxically, this case has been seen by at least one abortion-rights supporter as potentially providing a pretext or justification for abortion opponents to attack abortion rights. As quoted in the Times, Kerry Abel, chairwoman of the British pro-choice group, Abortion Rights, stated,
As heartbreaking as this case is, it is opportunistic for antichoice organizations to use it to attack a woman's right to choose. One in three women in the U.K. will have an abortion for many, many individual reasons, and we shouldn't undermine free, safe, legal abortion based on one difficult case.
I certainly agree with that statement. Yet I see the judge's decision itself as ultimately representing an even greater threat to women's reproductive freedoms than the incidental fact that it may play into the hands of the anti-choice movement. This is not just because the decision is inconsistent with the principle of bodily autonomy but because it has the potential to undermine the right of bodily autonomy. If a judge can compel a woman to have an abortion against her will, what is to prevent another judge from compelling a woman to have a child against her will? Is it really so far-fetched that a pro-life or anti-choice interested party would cite a pregnant woman's desire to have an abortion as evidence that she is emotionally or cognitively incapable of making rational decisions in her own best interests, and seek to have her declared by a judge to be incapable of exercising informed consent? Is it so far-fetched that an anti-choice judge would be only too happy to respond by issuing such a decree and compelling the woman to bear a child against her will? The way things are going, in the United States, at any rate, such a scenario seems not just plausible but increasingly likely. (It was only two years ago that Brett Kavanaugh voted to impede the right of a young woman to obtain a legal abortion.) That is why this decision, although issued in the United Kingdom, constitutes an assault on both the principle and right of bodily autonomy. What is at stake here is the right of every individual to own and control her, his or their own body.
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